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Abstract 
The founders of the Bretton Woods System sixty years ago were primarily concerned with orderly exchange rate 
adjustment in a world economy that was characterized by widespread restrictions on international capital 
mobility. In contrast, the rapid pace of financial globalization during recent years poses new challenges for the 
international monetary system. In particular, large gross cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities means 
that the valuation channel of exchange rate adjustment has grown in importance, relative to the traditional trade 
balance channel. Accordingly, this paper empirically explores some of the inter-connections between financial 
globalization and exchange rate adjustment and discusses the policy implications. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Financial globalization has been one of the most important trends in the world economy in 
recent decades. This process has involved sharply rising foreign asset and liability positions, 
whether scaled by GDP or by domestic financial variables (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2003, 
Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). In addition to larger gross positions, financial globalization has 
also allowed a greater dispersion in net foreign asset positions, with a significant number of 
countries emerging as either large net creditors or net debtors (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2002a). In general, financial globalization is one of the key trends that has reshaped the 
global economy relative to the environment envisaged by the designers of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1944 and understanding its macroeconomic implications is crucial in formulating a 
view on the appropriate future direction for the international monetary system. 
 
One consequence of financial globalization is that the international spillovers from asset 
price and currency movements have been enhanced. In addition to affecting the direction and 
magnitude of net capital flows, asset price dynamics also generate changes in the valuation of 
existing investment positions. For instance, the value of the net liability position of the 
United States is quite sensitive to the relative movements in the U.S. versus non-U.S. equity 
markets and swings in the value of the dollar. Indeed, such valuation effects may be as 
important as current account imbalances in driving the dynamics of net foreign asset 
positions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001a, 2002a, Gourinchas and Rey 2004). 
 
Of course, asset price and currency movements cannot be viewed as exogenous influences on 
the value of international investment positions, since shifting global demands for various 
assets and liabilities are an important driver of financial returns and exchange rates (e.g. 
through the determination of country and currency risk premia). Moreover, there is an 
obvious interplay between the financial and trade accounts that provides another link 
between net foreign asset positions and exchange rates: a long-term debtor may require real 
depreciation in order to generate the trade surpluses that are the counterpart of sustained net 
investment income outflows (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002b, 2004b). 
 
In this paper we explore the interconnections between financial globalization and exchange 
rates. To establish the stylized facts about financial globalization, the first part of the paper 
examines trends in gross and net international investment positions and their components for 
a large set of advanced and emerging economies. In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) we 
documented for industrial countries an acceleration in the pace of financial globalization 
since the mid-1990s; in this paper we update our estimates of external assets and liabilities 
for a sample of emerging markets as well. 
1 As noted above, a central aspect of our analysis 
is the focus on the factors explaining the changes in external positions: not only capital flows 
but also valuation effects, such as those caused by asset price and exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
In the second part of the paper we first provide an analytical framework that is useful in 
understanding the dynamics of net foreign assets, and then explore the contribution of 
                                                 
1Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004c) explain the construction of the data.  
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currency movements to the revaluation component of net foreign asset dynamics. This 
relationship depends on a number of factors. For instance, the impact of an exchange rate 
depreciation will depend on gross foreign asset and liability holdings (in addition to the net 
position); the currency composition of both sides of the international balance sheet; and the 
co-movement between exchange rate changes and other financial returns.
2 These factors will 
vary across countries, according to the level of development, country size and other 
characteristics. Along one dimension, a high proportion of the liabilities of a major industrial 
country is likely to be denominated in its own currency, whereas a typical emerging market 
economy exhibits significant liability dollarization. Countries also differ as to the mix of 
short- and long-term debt and the levels of portfolio equity and FDI holdings in the 
international balance sheet: the impact of currency movements on the net external position is 
undoubtedly sensitive to the external capital structure.
3  
 
Our analysis suggests that theoretical work on open economy macroeconomics should strive 
to incorporate elements such as persistent non-zero net foreign asset positions, large gross 
asset cross-holdings and mixed portfolios of equity and debt instruments and illustrate why 
these features can make a difference to model dynamics and welfare analysis. Finally, in the 
last part of the paper we draw out the implications of our empirical work for policy analysis. 
In particular, we highlight that the valuation channel is unlikely to be open to policy 
manipulation on a sustainable basis. 
 
 
II.   TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a, 2003), we documented a number of stylized features of 
international capital flows and external positions in industrial countries. Flows to and from 
such countries increased substantially in recent years, both in absolute terms and as shares of 
GDP and domestic wealth. In this context, the increase in FDI and portfolio equity 
investment is particularly noteworthy. The increase in gross external assets and liabilities 
means that valuation effects have become more important. We highlight these features again 
below, with an updated dataset including both industrial countries and emerging markets.  
 
A.   Net flows and net positions, industrial countries 
Figure 1 plots net foreign assets (as a ratio of GDP) against GDP per capita, measured in 
current U.S. dollars, for the year 2003. There is a wide dispersion in net external positions 
among industrial countries, with Switzerland being by far the largest creditor, and New 
Zealand and Iceland the largest debtors in relation to GDP. The positive relation between net 
                                                 
2Tille (2003) provides an interesting analysis for the United States. 
 
3Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) analyze some of the determinants of the composition of the 





foreign assets and GDP per capita, shown in the Figure to hold in the cross-section, holds 
also along the time-series dimension—as a country gets richer, relative to trading partners, its 
net foreign asset position tends to improve (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002a).  
 
Table 1 summarizes net capital outflows from industrial countries over the period  
1999–2003, together with changes in their external position. In absolute terms, Japan has 
been the largest capital exporter, while Switzerland and Norway had the highest net outflows 
relative to their GDP. On the other side, the United States had by far the largest net inflows in 
absolute terms, and also as a ratio of GDP.  
 
While there is clearly a positive relation between net outflows and change in the net external 
position, the Table highlights the importance of valuation effects: for example, the United 
Kingdom was a net capital importer during this period, but its net external position improved 
by 7.5 percent of GDP; Canada instead was a net capital exporter, but its net position 
deteriorated. In absolute terms, the difference between net capital inflows and the change in 
the net asset position is particularly large for the United States—net inflows were over $600 
billion higher than the net accumulation of liabilities. The reasons for this discrepancy are 
further discussed below. 
 
B.   Gross flows and gross positions, industrial countries 
Figure 2 summarizes the evolution of gross external assets and liabilities in industrial 
countries during the past 20 years. The growth in international financial interdependence is 
striking: during this period, aggregate assets and liabilities tripled as a share of GDP, FDI 
assets and liabilities increased four-fold, portfolio equity assets and liabilities six-fold, and 
debt assets and liabilities 2 ½ times. Focusing on the most recent period, the chart also shows 
the effects of the global decline in stock market valuations between end-1999 and end-2002, 
which is the main factor behind the reduction in the stock of portfolio equity assets and 
liabilities during this period, and the recovery in stock market valuation and flows in 2003.
4 
 
Table 2 summarizes gross capital flows to and from industrial countries during the most 
recent period (1999–2003). The size of gross flows is remarkable, particularly to and from 
financial centers such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, but also to and from the euro 
area and, relative to GDP, Scandinavian countries. While net flows are also substantial, the 
data suggest that portfolio diversification, rather than intertemporal borrowing and lending, is 
the dominant motive for international asset transactions among industrial countries.  
 
The data in Table 2 also confirm the importance of valuation effects, in addition to gross 
flows, in explaining the dynamics of external assets and liabilities. For example, external 
                                                 
4 Only a few countries in our sample (including the United States) measure FDI at market 
value: hence, stock market fluctuations have a less dramatic impact on FDI stocks compared 
to portfolio equity holdings. Of course, the fall in foreign portfolio equity assets and 
liabilities relative to GDP does not imply a decline relative to  total domestic equity holdings.  
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liabilities (and, to a lesser extent, assets) in the United States increased by substantially less 
than the underlying flows. The primary reason was the decline in U.S. stock market 
valuations during this period, which reduced the value of both foreign equity and FDI 
holdings in the United States. The smaller decline in stock market valuations (measured in 
U.S. dollars) in other countries during this period helps explain the smaller capital losses 
incurred by U.S. investors on their foreign equity holdings.
5  
 
C.   Net flows and net positions, emerging markets 
We focus on a sample of 21 emerging markets (listed in the Appendix). Figure 3 plots the 
evolution of the average current account balance as a ratio of GDP in our emerging markets’ 
sample. The key cycles in capital flows to emerging markets stand out clearly from this 
picture: the deterioration of current account imbalances in the late 1970s until the debt crisis, 
their sharp reversal during the remainder of the 1980s, the increase in imbalances during the 
early 1990s, and the new reversal following the 1994–95 Mexican crisis and especially the 
Asian crisis. Indeed, both the average and aggregate current account position of the emerging 
countries in our sample turned positive in 1998 and increased further in recent years.  
 
The dynamics of the net external position, expressed as a ratio of GDP, are plotted in  
Figure 4. It shows the deterioration caused by the debt crisis and its aftermath, a subsequent 
sharp improvement, the stabilization of the net external position from 1990 to 1996, the 
deterioration caused by the sharp declines in GDP and real exchange depreciation 
characterizing the Asian crisis, and the subsequent improvement associated with current 
account surpluses and strengthening currencies in Asia. In the data, there is no evidence of an 
increased dispersion in current account balances across the countries in our sample (that is, 
there is a significant common trend in the net capital flows to this emerging market group), 
while the dispersion of the underlying net external positions has increased.  
 
Figure 5 plots the net foreign asset position, scaled by GDP, in relation to GDP per capita in 
current US dollars at end-2002. While there is still a positive relation between net foreign 
assets and GDP per capita, this relation is much weaker than for industrial countries. Indeed, 
creditors include economies with high GDP per capita, such as Taiwan province of China, 
but also economies with much lower GDP per capita, such as Russia and Venezuela.
6  
 
                                                 
5 The difference in stock market performance between the United States and world markets is 
entirely accounted for by the year 2003, during which the sharp depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar raised foreign stock returns measured in dollars. Between end-1998 and end-2002 the 
decline in stock market valuations in the United States and world markets was similar.  
6 In addition to the standard macroeconomic drivers of net foreign asset positions that were 
emphasized by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a), political risk and natural resource 
endowments are other variables that may be important, especially in reference to the 
countries listed here.  
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Table 3 characterizes the size of net capital flows among some countries in our sample, both 
in absolute terms and as a ratio of GDP, during the period 1999–2003. The table shows a 
number of Latin American and Central European countries as the largest net recipients of net 
capital flows, although Turkey and Argentina experienced net outflows if IMF and 
“exceptional” financing are netted out. 
7As the data on current account dynamics suggest, a 
number of emerging markets—particularly Asian countries, together with Russia—have been 
on average net capital exporters, to a substantial degree. For example, Thailand’s cumulative 
net outflows over the 5-year period total over 30 percent of its 2003 GDP.  
  
 
D.   Gross flows and gross positions, emerging markets 
Figure 6 provides a longer-term perspective on the size of external assets and liabilities in 
these emerging markets. Both assets and liabilities have increased substantially as a ratio of 
GDP during the past 20 years. However, there is virtually no increase in average external 
liabilities when scaled by exports, rather than GDP, while the trend increase in external assets 
is still visible. This stands in contrast with the evidence for the advanced economies, where 
the increase, especially since the mid-1990s, is very strong even as a share of exports.  
 
As noted earlier, an interesting question is whether the composition of external assets and 
liabilities has changed over time. Table 4 provides evidence that highlights the increased 
relative importance of direct investment and portfolio equity liabilities. The averages hide 
substantial heterogeneity—countries such as Chile and the Central European economies in 
our sample (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) have external equity liabilities above 50 
percent of GDP, while the levels tend to be lower in Asian economies.   
 
The table also documents the increase in foreign exchange reserves, expressed as a share of 
GDP, during the past 20 years. It should be noted, however, that this increase has gone hand 
in hand with the increase in other external assets, so that at the end of 2002 reserves in our 
sample account for the same share of total external assets as in 1982 (over one third). Direct 
investment and portfolio equity assets have also increased during the past two decades, and 
by 2002 represented around 12 percent of GDP and over 20 percent of total external assets.  
 
Table 5 characterizes gross capital flows to and from some emerging economies during the 
period 1999–2003. The pattern reveals an interesting dichotomy. For a number of countries, 
gross flows primarily reflect intertemporal borrowing or lending decisions, with countries 
accumulating net assets or net liabilities—either cumulative inflows or cumulative outflows 
are clearly dominant (see also Table 3). Among countries that accumulated substantial net 
assets, a number of East Asian countries stand out, particularly Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
and Thailand, together with oil-exporting countries such as Russia. For another group of 
countries, instead, gross inflows and gross outflows have both been large and roughly similar 
                                                 
7 See IMF (1993) for a description of balance-of-payments transactions classified as 
exceptional financing.  
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in magnitude, reflecting increased financial integration with the world economy. Examples 
include Chile and India. China has experienced large inflows and outflows, but also 
significant net foreign asset accumulation. Of course, similar aggregate levels of gross 
inflows and gross outflows can conceal significant net imbalances within specific asset 
categories: for instance, China is a major net recipient of FDI flows while simultaneously 
accumulating a significant volume of foreign reserves. 
 
Having provided a broad characterization of the growth in international balance sheets in 
recent years for both advanced and emerging economies, we next turn to providing a simple 
framework for understanding the underlying drivers. 
 
 
III.    EXTERNAL ASSET DYNAMICS 
In this section, we provide a simple accounting framework that relates the dynamics of net 
foreign assets to trade flows, growth, rates of return, and real exchange rates. The goal is to 
lay out the various channels by which exchange rates and other macroeconomic 
fundamentals can affect the external adjustment process. We then decompose the factors 
underlying changes in net foreign assets over the past decade for a set of emerging markets.  
 
A.   Accounting for external asset dynamics 
The change in net foreign assets B can be written as the sum of net capital outflows and net 
capital gains: 
 
  1 () tt t t t B BF X F A K G − − ≡∆ − +  (1) 
where  t FX ∆  is net accumulation of foreign exchange reserves,  t FA  is net capital inflows 
(excluding reserves), and KG is the net capital gain on the net external position outstanding 
(change in stock minus underlying flow). Denote by CA the current account balance, KA the 
capital account balance, and EO  net errors and omissions.
 8 Making use of the basic balance 
of payments identity  0 CA KA FA FX EO ++− ∆+≡ , we can re-write (1) as follows: 
 
  1 tt t t t t B B C AK AE OK G − − ≡+++ (2) 
 
In line with statistical reporting practices, all variables are expressed in US dollars. Equation 
(2) can also be expressed as follows: 
  
  11 1 () ( )
AL
tt t t t t t t t t B BB G S T K A E Oi A i LK G −− − −≡ + + + − +   (3) 
 
                                                 
8 In balance of payments’ statistics (IMF, 1993) the so-called ‘capital account’ measures 
certain transfers (such as debt forgiveness); capital flows are recorded in the financial 
account.   
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where BGST is the balance of trade in goods and services plus net transfers, A and L are 
external assets and liabilities, respectively, and 
A
t i , 
L
t i  are the nominal yields on these assets 
and liabilities.  




1 1 $ ()
1
AL
tt tt t t
tt t t t t
tt
iA iL K G







−≡ + + + −
+
   (4) 
 
where   t γ  is the growth rate of nominal GDP measured in US dollars. Another way to  
re-write the above expression is as follows: 
 
  11 1 $ ()
(1 )(1 ) 1
tt t t
tt t t t t t
tt t t
KG d g






−≡+ + + − − ⎢⎥ ++ + ⎣⎦
 (5) 
where g is the economy’s real growth rate, π is the rate of inflation (measured with the GDP 
deflator), and d is the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar. In 
other words, changes in the net external position can be due to several factors: 
 
1.  the current account;  
2.  net capital gains (measured in US dollars);  
3.  the capital account and net errors and omissions; 
4.  the effect of exchange rate changes on the past net foreign asset position;
 9 
5.  the effect of real GDP growth on the past net foreign asset position. 
 
An alternative way to express equation  (5) is in terms of overall rates of return on external 
assets and liabilities. Define  ()
AL
tt kk as the rate of capital gain on external assets (liabilities), 
measured in US dollars, so that 11
AL













 be the real rate 
of return on foreign assets, measured in US dollars, with an analogous definition holding for 
the rate of return on foreign liabilities  ˆ
L
t r . In this case we can re-write (5) as follows: 
 
                                                 
9 If external assets and liabilities are all denominated in domestic currency, the capital gain 
effect will go exactly in the opposite direction from the exchange rate change effect. Indeed, 
assume for simplicity that asset prices in domestic currency do not change. In this case, the 
capital gain expressed in domestic currency is zero, but expressed in dollars it becomes 
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Equation (6) shows several factors that can account for the dynamics of net foreign assets: 
the adjusted trade balance, the difference between the real rate of return and the growth rate, 
adjusted for the bilateral real exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, and differences in returns 
between foreign assets and liabilities.  
 
If we express the real rates of return in domestic currency and denote them by  ,
AL
tt rr , 
equation (6)  takes the more familiar form: 




tt t t t t t
tt
rg rr




−≡ + + + +
++
 (7) 
This framework delivers several important insights. First, the gap between current production 
and current absorption (i.e. the trade balance) is only one factor in determining the aggregate 
evolution of the net foreign asset position: it is vital to also keep track of valuation and 
“denominator” effects.  Second, as is shown by the third term on the right hand side (RHS) of 
equation (6), the difference between the rate of return and the growth rate, interacted with the 
inherited net foreign asset position, exerts a potentially powerful influence on its current 
dynamics. Third, as captured by the last term on the RHS in equation (6) , the gross scale of 
the international balance sheet matters in addition to the net position: even if the inherited net 
foreign asset position is zero, the accumulated levels of gross foreign assets and liabilities 
will influence the overall dynamics to the extent that the rates of return differ between the 
two sides of the international balance sheet. 
 
B.   The evolution of net foreign assets in emerging markets 
In Table 6 we provide a simple decomposition of changes in the ratio of net foreign assets to 
GDP between end-1990 and end-2002 for a selection of emerging markets in our sample. 
The breakdown follows equation (4), so that changes in net foreign assets are given by the 
sum of the current account (itself divided into trade balance and investment income), capital 
account and errors and omissions, capital gains (including the effects of exchange rate 
changes on the net external position), and the effects of growth on net external assets.  
 
A number of features are worth highlighting:  
 
•  despite a cumulative current account in balance or surplus, countries such as 
Indonesia and Thailand experienced a deterioration in the ratio of net foreign assets to 
GDP. For both countries, this occurred because of ‘capital losses’—linked to the real 
depreciation of their currencies during the period.  
 
•  On the other side, the Czech Republic’s and Mexico’s external position deteriorated 
by much less than the large cumulative current account deficits would suggest, thanks  
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to substantial capital gains on their net external position—linked to the real 
appreciation of their currencies between end-1990 and end-2002.  
 
More generally, the Tables highlights the need to focus not only on the current account 
(which includes the yield on external assets and liabilities), but also on economic growth and 
the overall rates of return on the external portfolio in order to understand the evolution of net 
foreign assets. Indeed, growth and especially valuation effects can have an impact on the 
evolution of the external position that is of the same order of magnitude as trade imbalances. 
 
IV.   EXCHANGE RATES AND THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
The framework summarized in equation (6) highlights the potential contribution of shifts in 
exchange rates in determining the dynamics of external asset positions. In this section, we 
first briefly review the “traditional” channels by which exchange rates influence the 
adjustment process, before focusing on the valuation channel (i.e. the impact of the exchange 
rate on the rates of return earned on holdings of foreign assets and liabilities). 
 
A.   Exchange Rates, the Trade Balance and Real Output 
The inter-connection between the exchange rate and the trade balance is among the  
most-studied questions in international economics, in both academic and policy circles. From 
a long-run perspective, the classical transfer problem postulates that persistent creditor 
nations should have more appreciated real exchange rates. The mechanism underlying the 
transfer problem hypothesis is that the positive international investment returns earned by 
long-run creditors have their counterpart in trade deficits and attendant real appreciation.  
 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b, 2004b) find considerable empirical support for the transfer 
problem, for both industrial and developing countries. However, they find the magnitude of 
the effect differs with country characteristics such as openness, size and the level of 
development. In relation to financial globalization, important findings are that the transfer 
problem is smaller in the absence of current and capital account restrictions and that equity 
financing reduces the size of the transfer effect relative to debt financing. 
 
At a shorter horizon, the interplay between the exchange rate and the trade balance is 
complex and less well understood. In particular, the cyclical correlation between the 
variables will depend on the nature of the shocks hitting the economy, with nominal, fiscal 
and real shocks generating different co-movement patterns between the variables. However, 
in policy terms, there is a broad consensus that exchange rate depreciation is typically 
required if the objective is to engineer an improvement in the trade balance. Empirical 
studies of the elasticities of trade volumes to exchange rates and income levels provide 
extensive support for this proposition (Hooper et al 2000).  Again, the pace of financial 
globalization and “real” globalization (in terms of product market integration) will influence 
these key elasticities. For instance, the scale of exchange rate adjustment is eased, as foreign 
goods become better substitutes for domestic goods. In terms of financial globalization, 




In tracking the dynamics of the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, real exchange rates also 
operate by determining the real value of domestic output in terms of international price 
comparisons. For instance, if variables are measured in US dollars, a foreign asset that is 
constant in real dollar terms will shrink relative to the constant-dollar value of GDP if real 
appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar occurs. This “denominator” effect is highlighted in 
equation (8) in the previous section and is powerful channel by which the real exchange rate 
may influence the dynamics of the NFA/GDP ratio.  
 
However, in addition to these well-known channels, exchange rates also potentially influence 
the dynamics of international asset holdings through influencing the rates of return on foreign 
assets and liabilities.
10 We focus on this valuation channel in the rest of this section. 
 
 
B.   The Valuation Channel: A Conceptual Framework 
As outlined earlier in the paper, the dynamics of net foreign assets depend not only on the 
trade balance but also on the rates of return earned on accumulated foreign assets and paid 





tt t t t NETRET r A r L − − =−  (8) 
 
where the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities A and L are now expressed in domestic 
currency. Since these positions are predetermined from a time-t perspective, the net 
















It is clear from this expression that exchange rate changes can have a non-zero valuation 
impact even if the initial net foreign asset position is balanced, so long as the rates of return 
on foreign assets and liabilities are differentially affected by a shift in the exchange rate.
11 
                                                 
10 Clearly, in tracking a ratio, there is some discretion in terms of attributing the impact of an 
exchange rate change to the numerator or the denominator via the choice of the reference 
currency. In the next subsection, we look at the levels of foreign assets and liabilities in terms 
of real domestic currency. 
11 Strictly speaking, the impact on the returns on foreign assets and liabilities is not the only 
“valuation” effect of exchange rate changes. As highlighted by the debate over the Marshall-
Lerner condition and re-emphasized by the current debate about limited exchange rate pass-
through, exchange rate movements also exert a “pure” valuation effect on the trade balance 
to the extent that import and export volumes are unresponsive to exchange rate changes.  
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The magnitude of the valuation channel is directly increasing in the gross scale of the 
international balance sheet: the relevance of this channel for aggregate net foreign asset 
dynamics is growing in line with the spectacular accumulation of gross foreign asset and 
liability holdings in recent years. Relatedly, the valuation channel also depends on the 
composition of the international balance sheet, since the sensitivity of returns to exchange 
rates will vary across investment categories and will also depend on the currency 
composition of foreign assets and liabilities (and on the extent of hedging).  
 
Of course, even if the exchange rate does indeed have a valuation impact, it does not mean 
that the net foreign asset position will move one-for-one. First, exchange rate changes also 
have a direct impact on the trade balance. Second, a valuation gain entailsrepresents a 
positive wealth effect that will plausibly raise consumption and investment, leading to a 
negative co-movement between the net returns term and the trade balance (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2002a, 2002b). Third, from another angle, a sufficiently- large negative valuation 
effect may lead to a sudden stop in capital flows that forces the trade balance to move into 
surplus. Finally, it is important to remember that it is the net valuation effect that matters: a 
capital gain on foreign assets may be fully offset by a capital gain on foreign liabilities.
12 
 
In addition, equation (9) only captures the contemporaneous impact of a change in the 
exchange rate. Some returns may respond to the exchange rate only with a lag (for instance, 
the future profitability of FDI positions may be affected by current exchange rate 
movements).  In addition, current exchange rate movements may lead to a revision of 
expectations about future exchange rate changes, which in turn feed into the ex-ante returns 
required to hold particular foreign asset and liability positions. 
 
As was discussed earlier in the paper, there are polar cases in which the impact of exchange 
rate movements on rates of return is straightforward. For instance, the domestic rate of return 
on an unhedged foreign asset that offers a fixed foreign-currency return will fall one-for-one 
with the rate of real appreciation: a given foreign-currency return will be diminished by the 
fall in the real domestic value of foreign currency. Conversely, the domestic rate of return on 
a foreign liability that offers a fixed domestic-currency return will be unaffected by a shift in 
the real exchange rate. However, the domestic rate of return on a foreign liability that offers a 
fixed foreign-currency return (e.g. foreign currency debt or domestic debt that offers a  
dollar-linked rate of return) will also fall in proportion to the rate of real appreciation.  
 
More generally, the net impact of exchange rate movements on the value of holdings that 
                                                                                                                                                       
There are also potential valuation effects even on domestically-owned assets, but we restrict 
attention to the cross-border positions through which valuation effects have asymmetric 
redistribution effects on home and foreign investors. 
12 Cross-border hedging could automatically generate such a positive comovement. However, 
the extent to which hedging takes place is unclear: much hedging activity occurs between 
counterparties of the same nationality, with no net impact on the national risk profile.  
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carry a variable market return depends on the nature of the co-movements between exchange 
rates, asset prices and profitability (in the case of non-market assets such as FDI positions 
and some bank claims). In some cases, the inter-connections between exchange rates and the 
determinants of market returns can be quite subtle and complex and may also depend on the 
underlying source of an exchange rate shock.  
 
For instance, devaluation may be associated with an increase in the rate of return on foreign 
liabilities if it is associated with an increase in the profitability of foreign affiliates operating 
in the domestic market or, alternatively, if it engenders an increase in the country risk 
premium. On the other hand, a devaluation may be generated by a negative domestic 
productivity shock that also lowers the return earned by foreign investors. With respect to 
foreign assets, domestic real depreciation may be the result of superior overseas economic 
performance that raises the overseas rate of return. However, a negative domestic 
productivity shock may also reduce the overseas earnings of domestic multinationals, such 
that devaluation is accompanied by a decline in the overseas rate of return.
13  
 
In view of the range of possible theoretical scenarios, the strength of the valuation channel is 
ultimately an empirical issue. We first consider some case study evidence, before turning to 
cross-country quantitative exploration in the subsequent subsection.  
 
C.   Case Studies: the United States and Australia 
It is possible to gain some insight into the quantitative importance of the valuation impact of 
exchange rate movements for those countries that calculate the accounting decomposition 
about the relative importance of capital flows, market value capital gains and exchange rate 
capital gains in determining the dynamics of foreign asset and liability positions. This is 
possible to for two countries in our sample (the United States and Australia). Of course, an 
accounting decomposition does not reveal the complete contribution of the exchange rate 
valuation channel, since it does not take into account the potential indirect impact of the 
exchange rate on market values or on the revaluation of investment income flows. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present the decompositions for the United States and Australia respectively, 
showing the average annual relative contributions of each component in proportion to the 
inherited stocks of foreign assets (liabilities): 
  
                                                 
13 A further complication is that exchange rate movements may also affect the international 
tax planning of multinational corporations that may affect the distribution of reported 
earnings in different locations. See Sullivan (2004) on the trend increase in the shifting of 






































In addition, the tables display the standard deviations for these components. Figure 7 and 
Figure 8 present similar data, but scale the size of capital flows and valuation changes by 
GDP, so as to provide a ready reckoning of their macroeconomic impact.  
 
Table 7 and Figure 7 show the statistics for the United States over 1990–2003. While 
financial flows have traditionally been the dominant source of balance sheet growth, the 
1996–2003 period saw a much greater role for capital gains. Indeed, the contribution of 
market-value capital gains exceeded that of financial flows in the growth of the foreign asset 
holdings of the United States during the global stock market boom of 1995–1999, with a 
similar contribution to the growth in the value of foreign liabilities. Conversely, and 
consistently with the evidence in Tables 1 and 2, the global correction in asset prices during 
2000–2003 saw a decline in the market value of both foreign assets and liabilities. 
 
Table 7 highlights the role of the exchange rate valuation channel. The 5.1 percent average 
annual dollar appreciation during 1996–2001 was associated with an annual average 
1.7 percent fall in the value of US foreign assets. In contrast, the sharp dollar depreciation 
during 2002–03 was associated with an annual average 5.5 percent increase in its foreign 
asset position. This gain helped to offset the impact of the growing current account deficit on 
the U.S. net external position. (Throughout, in line with expectations, the exchange rate 
channel had a near-zero impact on the stock of US foreign liabilities.) In terms of relative 
stability, capital flows have been much less volatile than either of the capital gain 
components. 
 
Turning now to the Australian evidence, Table 8 and Figure 8 show that the exchange rate 
valuation channel has been more important than in the US case. For instance, the exchange 
rate valuation term was a bigger contributor than either financial flows or market-value 
capital gains in the growth of foreign assets during the 1997.2–2001.1 period of real 
depreciation of the Australian dollar. Although, in contrast to the US case, Australian foreign 
liabilities are also sensitive to the exchange rate, this side of the international balance sheet is 
only about half as sensitive as the foreign asset position. This is consistent with a larger role 
for holdings denominated in domestic currency in foreign liabilities than in foreign assets.  
 
 These case studies of the United States and Australia provide suggestive evidence about the 
importance of the valuation channel in driving fluctuations in international asset holdings. 




D.   Regression Analysis, Industrial Countries 
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of rates of return on foreign assets and liabilities to 
movements in trade-weighted multilateral exchange rates. 
14In addition to the aggregate 
positions, we also examine returns for the separate investment categories (FDI; portfolio 
equity; portfolio debt; and other (debt)), since the relation between exchange rate movements 
and rates of return should depend on the specific characteristics of each investment class. 
 
 
Our specification is given by 
 
  
  log( )
A
it it it rr e r u αβ = +∆ +  (10) 
 
where the dependent variable is the real domestic-currency return on foreign assets in 
investment category i and the regressor is the log change in the trade-weighted real effective 
exchange rate.
15 We run an analogous equation for the rate of return on foreign liabilities.
16  
Our primary interest is just in establishing the direction and magnitude of the 
contemporaneous co-movement between the exchange rate and rates of return.
17 We do not 
attempt to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated changes in the real exchange 
rate: however, real exchange rates are largely unpredictable at an annual horizon (at least for 
our sample of advanced countries), such that this may be a fairly-innocuous assumption.
18 
 
                                                 
14 While the most appropriate real exchange rate measure would be a “finance-weighted” 
index, reflecting the relative importance of host or source countries in external holdings, the 
strong correlation between the geographical pattern of trade and financial flows ensures that 
a trade-weighted exchange rate is a reasonable proxy.  
15 The rate of return on foreign assets in year t is measured as the sum of investment income 
and capital gains earned in that year, divided by foreign assets at the end of year  1 t − . 
16 Clearly, this is a very parsimonious setup. However, in addition to being suited to our short 
data span, capturing the simple bivariate relation is an obvious first step, even if it does not 
rule out the possibility that any impact of the exchange rate on the rate of return may just be 
proxying for the role played by some omitted variable that commonly influences both the rate 
of return and the exchange rate or may just reflect endogeneity bias. 
17 We could alternatively present the simple correlations between returns and exchange rate 
changes. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003). 
18 We return to the issue of the predictability of exchange rates in the discussion of results.  
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We begin by examining the rates of return on foreign assets in Table 9.
19 The results for total 
foreign assets are given in column (1). In all cases, the estimated coefficient is negative: real 
appreciation is associated with a fall in the domestic-currency rate of return earned on foreign 
assets. For a number of countries, the estimated coefficient is in fact very close to -1: this 
one-to-one mapping is consistent with a process by which the foreign-currency real return on 
foreign assets is orthogonally determined and the exchange rate just acts to convert the 
foreign-currency return into domestic terms.
20  
 
The smallest estimated coefficient (in absolute value) in the sample is for the U.S. at -0.37. 
This admits a number of interpretations. First, some proportion of U.S. foreign assets is 
denominated in dollars and hence their value is not directly affected by exchange rate 
movements. Second, dollar appreciation could be associated with an increase in returns on 
foreign-currency foreign assets. One example would be a positive productivity shock in the 
U.S. that both appreciates the dollar and raises returns in U.S. financial markets. If foreign 
financial markets positively co-move with the U.S., foreign-currency asset returns would also 
rise at the same time. A positive U.S. productivity shock could also raise the profits earned 
overseas by U.S. multinationals, such that foreign-currency return rises in that case as well.   
 
The results for FDI assets are given in column (2).
21  For most countries, FDI positions are 
still measured at book value, rather than market value, and therefore the valuation channel is 
typically understated. However, currency movements should still matter, since these would 
affect factors such as the current replacement cost of capital goods and fixtures, both 
domestically and overseas.  In column (2), the fixed-effects panel estimate of the impact of 
                                                 
19 In terms of country selection for the regressions, we only include those with at least 
thirteen years of data on rates of return. In addition, we rule out observations that may be 
contaminated by factors such as revisions in methodology and other corrections. 
20 In some cases, we observe a coefficient above unity, which means that real appreciation is 
associated with a fall in foreign-currency returns on foreign assets: the domestic investor 
“loses twice” by suffering both a low foreign-currency return and an unfavorable conversion 
rate back into domestic real terms. Such a pattern could be generated, for instance, if the 
domestic business cycle is asymmetric with respect to the international business cycle: the 
domestic currency appreciates when international partners are doing badly (as proxied by 
poor foreign-currency rates of return). This, of course, is a risk-leveraging pattern of co-
movement between foreign-currency returns and the domestic real exchange rate. 
 
21 In the sample represented in this table, only the Netherlands and Australia record FDI at 
market value. The US reports positions measured at both book and market value. For 
comparability with the countries that only report book values, the US estimates in these 
tables refer only to the book value measure of FDI. However, for the US, if we use the rate of 
return based on FDI at market value then the exchange rate coefficient in the FDI asset 




real appreciation on the real return on FDI foreign assets is -0.76. However, there are some 
cases in which the coefficient is substantially above unity: for these countries, real 
appreciation tends to be associated with low foreign-currency real returns on FDI assets.  
 
We next examine the returns on portfolio equity assets in column (3). The fixed-effects panel 
estimate is very close to -1, which is consistent with orthogonal contributions of exchange 
rate movements and foreign-currency rates of return to the domestic-currency real rate of 
return. Two exceptions to this rule are Germany and Switzerland: for these countries, real 
appreciations have coincided on average with periods of strongly negative world stock 
market returns, and hence disappointing foreign-currency returns on their equity portfolios.  
 
Column (4) displays the results for foreign assets in the portfolio debt category. There is 
strong covariation between the exchange rate and domestic-currency returns is typically quite 
good and the estimated coefficients are consistent with the foreign-currency returns on 
foreign portfolio debt assets being exogenously determined with respect to the domestic real 
exchange rate. However, the United States coefficient is only -0.65, consistent with the fact 
that a considerable proportion of its foreign bond holdings are denominated in US dollars.  
 
Finally, we turn to the “other” investment category in column (5). This category largely 
comprises bank lending. Since banks do not “mark to market” all assets and liabilities but 
rather carry a high proportion at book value, the rates of returns in this category will be 
dominated by the yield component, with capital gains and losses understated. However, on 
the assets side, the broad picture is quite similar to that for portfolio debt. Again, an 
important exception is the US, where the coefficient estimate is insignificant: again, a good 
candidate explanation is that a high proportion of its foreign lending is in US dollars. 
 
We turn to the rates of return on foreign liabilities in Table 10. In terms of the results for total 
foreign liabilities in column (1), we see quite a mixed pattern in terms of the estimated 
exchange rate coefficients across countries. As was shown also in Table 7, For the United 
States, the rate of return paid out on foreign liabilities is totally unaffected by movements in 
the real exchange rate—consistent with the fact that foreign liabilities are almost entirely 
dollar-denominated and offer returns that not linked to exchange rate fluctuations (e.g. bank 
deposits or fixed-interest debt instruments). At the other extreme, the estimated coefficient 
for Finland is -1.8.
22 The fixed-effects panel estimate is -0.68: this generally indicates that 
                                                 
22 Albeit significant only at the 10 percent level. Although a pattern of high real returns plus 
exchange rate depreciation is also evident in the early 1990s, the most striking period for 
Finland is the post-EMU 1999–2002 period: in 1999 the return on its foreign liabilities was 
large (driven by gains in Nokia’s share price during the equity market boom), while its real 
exchange rate depreciated (on account of the fall in the external value of the euro). In 
contrast, the stock market reversals of 2001–2002 were accompanied by an appreciating real 
exchange rate (as the euro’s external value recovered). This case is a vivid illustration of the 
importance of co-movements between exchange rates and asset prices. It also underlines that 
exchange rates need not always move in a “risk-sharing” manner, which applies a fortiori for 
members of a currency union that have little influence on the external value of the currency.  
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With respect to FDI liabilities, column (2) of Table 10 suggests that there is little covariation 
between exchange rate fluctuations and real domestic returns. In part, this may be attributed 
to the fact that FDI positions are mostly measured at book value but the insignificance of the 
exchange rate also suggests that the earnings of foreign affiliates in the domestic market are 
not (contemporaneously) affected by exchange rate swings. This pattern is worth exploring 
further but would require the availability of higher-quality data. Similar to the case for FDI 
liabilities, most of the estimated country coefficients for portfolio equity liabilities are 
insignificantly different from zero: the domestic-currency real return offered by portfolio 
equity liabilities is not systematically affected by the exchange rate. Again, this is somewhat 




Only Canada and Australia show a significant connection between exchange rate movements 
and the rate of return paid out on foreign bond liabilities. For the others, the results support 
the caricature of bond liabilities that offer a domestic rate of return that is invariant to 
exchange rate fluctuations.
25 With respect to other liabilities, a number of countries display 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
23 In no case is the estimated coefficient significantly positive. This is quite surprising, since 
some of the mechanisms discussed earlier in order to explain a negative relation between 
exchange rate appreciation and the rate of return on foreign assets should symmetrically 
imply a positive association between exchange rate appreciation and the rate of return on 
foreign liabilities. For instance, a positive domestic productivity shock might raise 
profitability of foreign affiliates operating in the domestic market and generally boost 
domestic asset prices, while at the same time generating real appreciation.  
 
24 Indeed, there is only one significant country coefficient (Germany), but it is negative and 
large (-2.9) negative. This means that declines in the German stock market are typically 
associated with real appreciation. Since the point coefficient is fairly similar for both assets 
and liabilities, this implies that German real appreciation tends to occur during phases of 
disappointing global stock returns, since the returns on German overseas assets fall in 
addition to the returns paid out on domestic stocks owned by foreign investors. 
 
25 Even for Canada and Australia, the pattern of co movement is negative: real appreciation is 
associated with low domestic rates of return on their foreign bond liabilities. In part, this may 
suggest that exchange rate movements for these countries have a substantial predictable 
component, since foreign investors would be prepared to accept a low domestic-currency 
return if real appreciation were anticipated. The predictability hypothesis receives some 
support from the empirical work of Chen and Rogoff (2003), who show that “commodity” 
currencies (such as the Australian and Canadian dollars) are more predictable than other 
currencies. Of course, another potential contributory factor is the extent to which these 
countries issue bond liabilities in foreign currency.  
 
- 18 -
significantly negative coefficients, with the estimates far above unity for Australia and Spain. 
For this pair, the pattern is akin to that experienced by emerging markets: real depreciation is 
associated with an increase in the foreign-currency return paid to foreign investors.  
 
In summary, the regression analysis in Tables 9 and 10 delivers a number of interesting 
lessons. First, especially on the foreign assets side, exchange rate movements are an 
important covariate of rates of return, consistent with the operation of a powerful valuation 
channel. Second, real appreciation is typically associated not only with lower real returns on 
foreign assets, but also lower real returns on foreign liabilities: at least for small net 
positions, this implies that the net valuation impact of exchange rate movements on the net 
foreign asset position has been limited. Third, the sensitivity of returns to exchange rates 
does vary across investment categories: the composition of the international balance sheet is 
an important determinant of the aggregate valuation effect. Fourth, the United States behaves 
quite differently to other countries in that the rates of return on its liabilities (in all investment 
categories) are unaffected by currency movements. Since dollar depreciation raises the return 
on its foreign assets, this means that the valuation channel in the US case may indeed be a 
powerful adjustment mechanism in correcting its large external liability position.  We return 
to the feasibility of this option later in this paper.  
 
E.   Exchange rates and rates of return, emerging markets 
In general, we would expect the relation between domestic-currency rates of return and 
changes in the real exchange rate to be even stronger for emerging markets, which in general 
have less scope for borrowing or lending in domestic currency. Careful empirical work has to 
face the severe difficulties in measuring such rates of return: among these, the lack of precise 
historical data on international investment positions; stock-flow discrepancies; debt reduction 
and debt forgiveness agreements, and default episodes.  
 
While aware of these limitations, we have constructed rough estimates of rates of return on 
external assets and liabilities for our emerging-market sample. The methodology is based on 
estimating the stock of external assets and liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004c), and 
using data on interest payments and capital flows to back out rates of return.  
 
A simple panel regression with fixed effects of real domestic-currency rates of return on 
external liabilities on changes in the real effective exchange rate gives a coefficient of -0.86 
with a t-statistic of 19.
26 As Figure 9 shows, this relation holds not only along the time-series 
dimension, but also in the cross-section. The Figure shows a strong negative relation (plotted 
for the year 1997, a year of large exchange rate depreciations in the Asian countries of our 
sample) between the domestic currency rate of return on external liabilities and the real 
effective exchange rate.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
26 A similar regression for assets gives a coefficient of -1, consistent with the fact that 




F.   The Valuation Channel in International Macroeconomic Models 
The preceding empirical analysis has indicated that revaluations are an important contributor 
to net foreign asset dynamics. However, it has been standard in both the traditional  
Mundell-Fleming approach and contemporary “new open economy macroeconomics” to 
consider scenarios in which the initial net foreign asset position is zero and the gross scale of 
international balance sheets is ignored. This rules out any consideration of the valuation 
channel in terms of macroeconomic behavior and the analysis of alternative policies.  
 
However, two important recent exceptions are provided by Benigno (2001) and Tille (2004).  
In a two-country model, Benigno (2001) shows that monetary shocks have much larger real 
effects if the initial global steady state is characterized by imbalances in net external 
positions, since exchange rate movements generate a net valuation effect that has asymmetric 
effects on home and foreign countries. One implication is that countries will disagree about 
the optimal monetary policy, since the valuation channel acts to transfer wealth between 
home and foreign citizens. 
 
Tille (2004) considers the case of initially-balanced net foreign positions but allows for 
different levels of scale in terms of gross holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. Matching 
the US data, he shows that an increase in gross cross-holdings of domestic-currency and 
foreign-currency bonds means that the welfare impact of a surprise monetary expansion is 
greatly magnified in the case that the foreign-currency share of foreign assets is larger than 
the foreign-currency share of foreign liabilities. Indeed, his calibration suggests that the 
welfare impact of the valuation channel is 350 percent more powerful than the traditional 
channel, since devaluation confers a sizeable capital gain on the home country in his setup.  
 
Clearly, much remains to be done to improve the theoretical treatment of the valuation 
channel in macroeconomic models. For instance, it would be highly desirable (albeit 
extremely challenging) to incorporate a realistic profile of the international balance sheet 
(with its mix of FDI, portfolio equity and debt instruments) and jointly determine the 
equilibrium response of real variables, asset prices and exchange rates to various shocks and 
policies. In this regard, Hau and Rey (2003) and Pavlova and Rigobon (2003) have made 
interesting recent attempts to jointly model financial returns and exchange rates. 
 
Finally, another important research question is to assess the contribution of the valuation 
channel to persistent shifts in net foreign assets. That is, the valuation effects induced by 
currency and asset price movements can generate volatility in the value of external assets and 
liabilities but it is an open question as to how important are valuation effects versus current 
account imbalances in driving the lower-frequency component of net foreign asset dynamics. 
On the agenda for future research is a better characterization of the relation between 
exchange rate movements and net foreign asset positions over time: for instance, the impact 
effect may primarily operate through the valuation channel, with a longer-term contribution 





V.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As was emphasized in discussing equation (6) above, financial globalization increases the 
empirical relevance of the valuation channel for exchange rate movements. Improving 
quantitative understanding of the valuation channel is obviously desirable, in order to keep 
better track of the dynamics of net foreign assets and international wealth effects. One 
helpful innovation would be for the relevant national statistical agencies to collect more 
information on the role played by currency movements in determining rates of return on 
foreign assets and liabilities.  
 
From a policy perspective, does the valuation channel offer a reliable method to address an 
excessive net external liability position? Gourinchas and Rey (2004) provide some evidence 
for the US that historical adjustment in its net foreign asset position has indeed in part relied 
on the valuation channel, with the exchange rate responding in a predictable, systematic 
manner during phases when its external position was “unsustainable.”  
 
However, there is good reason to be skeptical that the valuation channel can be relied upon to 
solve adjustment problems. Even for those countries for which a one-time surprise 
devaluation may indeed generate a positive valuation effect that improves the net foreign 
asset position, such a move would involve a reputational cost: future investors would require 
a larger premium in order to compensate for the risk of subsequent devaluations. Indeed, 
such manipulation of the exchange rate creates a classic time-consistency problem, with the 
standard recommendation that policymakers take steps to commit to not using the 
devaluation option as a form of capital levy. While the severity of this problem is one of the 
underlying factors behind the prevalence of liability dollarization and short-maturity debt 




Moreover, as has been highlighted repeatedly in this paper, it is important to recognize that 
the U.S. is a special case, in view of its ability to issue a large proportion of its liabilities in 
dollars. This capacity is related to the dollar’s status as the default reserve currency and “safe 
haven.” In turn, the dollar status helps explain the systematic positive difference between the 
rate of return gained on U.S. external assets and the one paid out on its liabilities. 
Nevertheless, further substantial increases in the U.S. net debtor position would raise the 
prospect of a substantial U.S. dollar depreciation, with the associated capital losses inflicted 
on U.S. creditors. In turn, this may threaten the special status of the dollar, also in light of the 
                                                 
27 Alberola (2003) discuss the impact of liability dollarization on the path of exchange-rate 
adjustment in emerging markets. He argues that the real exchange rate will tend to overshoot 
its equilibrium level, due to the need to foster higher current account surpluses in the 




emergence of the euro as an alternative international reserve currency, and raise the rate of 
return required by foreign investors on dollar instruments.  
 
It is interesting to speculate on the trend implications of financial globalization for exchange 
rate volatility. Along one dimension, if financial globalization improves international risk 
sharing, then more similar wealth dynamics could lead to more correlated aggregate demand 
patterns and thereby reduce the need for exchange rate shifts. However, as has been recently 
emphasized by Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2003) and Heathcote and Perri (2004), greater cross-
border risk-sharing could also permit increased specialization in production, with sectoral 
shocks under that scenario translating into greater real exchange rate variability. 
 
Along another dimension, the diversification of risks afforded by financial globalization may 
also permit greater dispersion in net foreign asset positions, through a weakening of the 
association between external imbalances and country risk premia. If that is the case and the 
pace of “real” globalization (i.e. the international integration of product markets) does not 
proceed sufficiently quickly, then large-scale real exchange rate movements may increase in 
frequency, as part of the adjustment process in coping with enlarged global imbalances.  
 
In light of these opposing forces, it is difficult to make a firm prediction about the net impact 
of ongoing financial globalization on exchange rate volatility. In turn, while financial 
globalization shifts the terms of the debate about the relative merits of alternative exchange 
rate systems, it does not obviously tilt the balance in one direction or the other in deciding 
between floating and fixed regimes.  
 
Of course, the acceleration of financial globalization in the 1990s also had a large impact on 
exchange rates, by arguably increasing the prevalence and severity of currency and financial 
crises. The policy response to the 1990s series of crises has been to emphasize the 
importance of adequate domestic financial regulation, the fragility of pegged exchange rates 
and robust fiscal control. However, our emphasis on the roles played by exchange rates and 
rates of return in driving net foreign asset dynamics also raises the question of whether 
national governments should seek to mould the international balance sheet in some fashion, 
either directly or by providing incentives to the private sector to insure against particular 
financial vulnerabilities. The rapid growth in official external reserves in many countries in 
recent years can be interpreted as one response to the risks associated with financial 
globalization. In addition, increased direct investment and portfolio equity flows can in 
principle improve risk-sharing by tying rates of return on external liabilities to domestic 
macroeconomic conditions. Although the literature is expanding rapidly, more research on 
this question is clearly needed. 
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has been concerned with the macroeconomic implications of financial 
globalization. Having established recent patterns in terms of gross and net international asset 
trade for both advanced and emerging market economies, we have shown that the dynamics 
of net foreign asset positions crucially depend on an array of factors beyond the value of the  
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trade balance: stocks matter, as well as flows. In particular, we have focused on the 
importance of the valuation channel of exchange rate adjustment: currency fluctuations 
influence the rates of return on the inherited stocks of foreign assets and liabilities, in 
addition to operating through the traditional trade balance channel. In turn, this raises a set of 
substantive policy questions about the optimal external capital structure and the exploitability 
of the valuation channel as an adjustment mechanism. 
 
An open question is how much further the financial globalization process will go: is the end 
point the idealized scenario of “perfect market integration”, or will barriers such as trade 
costs and imperfect information place a limit on the extent of integration? The impact of 
financial globalization on exchange rate behavior and the international adjustment 
mechanism is likely to remain near the top of the research and policy agendas. We hope that 
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Industrial countries sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.  
 
Emerging markets sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, China, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan province of China, Thailand, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Israel, South Africa, Turkey. 
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Table 1. Net capital outflows and changes in net external position 
Industrial countries, 1999–2003 
 
  Net outflows  Change in net foreign assets 
  Billions US$  Pct. of 2003 GDP Billions US$  Pct. of 2003 GDP
        
Japan                 558 13.0 452 10.5
Switzerland           167 53.8 82 26.6
Norway  75 34.1 86 38.9
Canada                74 8.5 -43 -5.0
Euro Area*  40 0.5 -205 -2.5
Sweden  33 10.9 9 2.8
Denmark               24 11.4 9 4.2
New Zealand          -7 -9.7 -4 -4.9
Australia             -88 -17.3 -157 -30.8
United Kingdom     -139 -7.8 134 7.5
United States  -2246 -20.4 -1594 -14.5
 
* Change in the net foreign asset position calculated as the sum of the change in the net 
positions of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain. 
 

















Table 2.  Gross capital flows to and from industrial countries (1999–2003) 
 
  Capital inflows    Capital outflows  Change in foreign 
liabilities 
  Change in foreign 
assets 
 billions  US$  percent of 
2003 GDP
billions US$ percent of 
2003 GDP
billions US$ percent of 
2003 GDP
billions US$ percent of 
2003 GDP
                  
United States  4167  38   1922  17   3250  30   1656  15
Euro Area  3569  44   3609  44   ...  ...   ...  ...
United Kingdom  2387  133   2247  125   2660  148   2794  155
Switzerland  343  111   510  165   468  151   551  178
Canada  223  26   297  34   301  35   258  30
Australia  212  42   124  24   346  68   189  37
Sweden  190  63   223  74   191  63   199  66
Denmark  143  68   167  79   184  87   193  91
Norway  121  55   196  89   167  75   253  114
Japan  106  2.5   664  15   147  3   599  14
New Zealand  23  29   15  20   24  31   20  26
                    
 









Table 3. Cumulative net capital flows to selected emerging markets, 1999-2003 
 
  Total    excluding IMF and 
exceptional financing 






  "Borrowers" 
          
Brazil  74.8 15.2    52.9 10.7 
Mexico  70.3 11.2    78.2 12.5 
Poland                37.9 18.1    37.9 18.1 
Hungary               22.1 26.7    22.1 26.7 
Czech Republic  16.7 18.7    16.7 18.7 
Turkey                14.8 6.2    -6.4  -2.7 
Argentina  14.1 11.1    -21.2  -16.7 
        
  "Lenders" 
        
China   -131.5 9.3    -131.5 9.3 
Russia  -117.4 27.1    -118.4 27.3 
Taiwan pr. of China -62.5 21.8    -62.5 21.8 
Korea  -56.7 9.4    -40.8 6.7 
Thailand  -44.1 30.8    -44.8 31.3 
Indonesia  -33.3 16.0    -33.5 16.1 
Malaysia  -27.7 26.7    -27.7 26.7 
 






Table 4. Indicators of International Financial Integration, Emerging Markets 




   
Average net external position  -32.6 -24.5  -26.2
  
Average external assets  15.8 24.9  55.5
  of which:    
     foreign exchange reserves  5.7 10.9  19.6
     FDI + portfolio equity  1.3 3.0  12.1
  
Average external liabilities  48.4 49.4  81.7
  of which:     
     FDI + portfolio equity  7.4 11.1  32.9
   
 
 
















Table 5. Gross capital flows to and from selected emerging markets, 1999–2003 
 
  Capital inflows    Capital outflows 
  Total    Excluding IMF and except. fin.    Total    FX reserves 




  billions US$  Percentage  of 
2003 GDP 




Percentage  of 
2003 GDP 
                     
China  259.1 18.3    259.1  18.3   390.6  27.7    258.6  18.3
Taiwan prov. of China  69.9  24.4   69.9 24.4    132.4  46.3    72.1  25.2
Korea  65.7  10.9   81.7 13.5    122.5  20.2    91.9  15.2
Philippines  63.7  86.7   63.5 86.5    82.1  111.7    3.6  4.9
Brazil  110.4  22.4   88.4 18.0    35.6  7.2    2.1  0.4
Mexico  80.3  12.8   88.2 14.1    10.0  1.6    28.0  4.5
Poland  54.8  26.2   54.8 26.2    16.9  8.1    2.2  1.1
India  32.9 5.7    33.3  5.7   37.9  6.5    41.0  7.1
Chile  34.1  50.7   34.1 50.7   29.0  43.0    -1.2 -1.8
                   
Indonesia  -21.6  -10.4   -21.8 -10.5    11.7  5.6    10.8 5.2
Thailand  -32.2  -22.5   -32.9 -23.0    11.9  8.3    8.6 6.0
                   














Table 6. Decomposition of change in foreign assets for selected emerging markets, 1991–2002 
(percent of GDP) 
 
 
Cumulative current account  Other factors 
 
 
Change in net 





acct + errors & 
omissions  Growth 
effect 
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− − − ∑  
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⎢ ⎥ ++ ⎣ ⎦
∑
 
           
Brazil -30.6  2.8 -30.6 -0.6 10.9 -13.1 -47.9
Czech Republic  -29.4  -23.5 -16.2 -0.2 -0.1 10.5 35.8
Indonesia -6.1  59.3 -53.3 0.8 26.1 -39.0 -16.1
Mexico -8.8  -6.2 -36.3 -2.9 17.7 19.0 32.5
Thailand -10.0  31.0 -31.8 -6.7 19.4 -21.9 -18.2
Turkey -21.3  14.2 -23.1 -0.1 11.6 -23.9 -2.9
 
Note: the breakdown of changes in the net foreign asset position reflects equation (5) in the text.  
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004c). 
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Table 7. US: Relative Contributions of Flows, Market Values and Exchange Rates to 
Dynamics of the International Balance Sheet, 1990–2003  
 
   Mean    Standard  Deviation 
 1990–95  1996–2001 2002–03  1990–2003 
        
CON__FLOW _FA  0.056  0.081  0.034  0.030 
CON__FLOW _FL  0.081  0.108  0.082  0.029 
        
CON_MV _FA  0.031  0.038  -0.016  0.088 
CON_MV _FL  0.022  0.034  -0.021  0.066 
        
CON_ER _FA  0.008  -0.017  0.055  0.030 
CON_ER _FL  0.000  -0.003  0.005  0.004 
        
 
Source:  US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We thank Cedric Tille for kindly sharing 
in electronic form his history of the BEA data releases. 
 
 
Table 8. Australia: Relative Contributions of Flows, Market Values and Exchange Rates to 
Dynamics of the International Balance Sheet, 1988.3–2004.2 
 










        
CON__FLOW  _FA  0.090 0.078 0.081 0.090  0.072 
CON__FLOW  _FL  0.017 0.040 0.061 0.016  0.036 
        
CON_MV  _FA  0.017 0.040 0.061 0.016  0.128 
CON_MV  _FL  0.014 0.005 0.024 0.007  0.052 
        
CON_ER _FA  0.020  -0.023  0.083  -0.022  0.11 
CON_ER _FL  0.014  -0.013  0.031  -0.012  0.047 
          
 














Table 9.  Exchange Rates and Rates of Return on Foreign Assets 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Total  FDI  Port_Eq  Port_Debt  Other 
      
USA  -0.37*** -0.57*** -1.24  -0.65*** -0.11 
       
UK  -1.01*** -0.83*** -0.74  -1.01*** -0.96*** 
        
Austria  -1.34** -3.85**    
       
France   -0.36     
       
Germany  -0.88*** -1.04*** -2.49*** -1.16*** -0.45*** 
       
Italy  -1.08*** -1.17***    
       
Netherlands  -0.38 -0.33 -0.61 -0.37 -0.42 
       
Sweden  -0.74* -0.63**     
       
Switzerland  -1.07*** -0.62**  -2.43*** -0.8**  -0.93*** 
       
Canada  -0.66*** -0.46*    -0.97*** -0.86*** 
        
Finland  -1.09*** -1.07**     
       
Iceland  -0.85 -0.5     
       
Spain  -0.69*** -1.62*** -0.55  -1.62*** -0.61** 
       
Australia  -0.57*** -0.65**  -0.55*  -0.89*** -0.41* 
       
       
Panel  -0.78*** -0.76*** -0.97*** -0.89*** -0.63*** 
       
 
Note: Beta coefficients from regression of rate of return on real appreciation. ***,**,* denote 
significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent levels respectively. OLS with robust standard errors. 
Panel estimation includes country fixed effects (not reported). Full regression results 
available from the authors upon request. Data availability varies by country, within  
1980–2003 span.  
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, and Lane and 





Table 10.  Exchange Rates and Rates of Return on Foreign Liabilities 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Total  FDI  Port_Eq  Port_Debt  Other 
       
USA  0.014  0.08 0.36 -0.26  0.05 
       
UK  -0.92*** -0.1  -0.52  -0.46*  -0.78*** 
       
Austria  -0.95 -0.35    
       
France   0.85     
       
Germany  -0.49**  -1.04 -2.9**  -0.45 -0.15 
       
Italy  -0.71*** -0.14     
       
Netherlands  -0.12 -0.33*  -0.48 -0.03 -0.20 
       
Sweden  -0.77*** -0.21     
       
Switzerland  -0.73***  -0.14 -0.57 -0.77 -0.84*** 
       
Canada  -0.52*** 0.06    -0.81*** -0.67*** 
        
Finland  -1.79* 0.91     
       
Iceland  -1.33*** -1.43     
       
Spain  -0.69*** 0.15  -1.28  -0.9  -1.52** 
       
Australia  -0.31*** 0.02  -0.44  -0.64*** -1.68*** 
       
       
Panel  -0.68*** -0.09  -0.56*  -0.60**  -0.79*** 
       
 
Note: Beta coefficients from regression of rate of return on real appreciation. ***,**,* denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. OLS with robust standard errors. 
Panel estimation includes country fixed effects (not reported). Full regression results 
available from the authors upon request. Data availability varies by country, within  
1980–2003 span.  
 











Figure 1. Net foreign asset position (ratio of GDP) and GDP per capita 
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook (GDP per capita) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 






 Figure 2. Composition of international portfolio, industrial countries 
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Note: Chart plots the sum of aggregate equity, FDI, and debt assets and liabilities as a share of 
aggregate GDP for a sample of industrial countries including: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. The sample choice is dictated by data availability.  
 





Figure 3. Average and aggregate current account to GDP ratio 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics and Lane and  





Figure 5. Net foreign assets and GDP per capita 
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook (GDP per capita), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 





Figure 6. Indicators of international financial integration, emerging markets 
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Figure 7. United States: Components of change in external assets and liabilities, 1990–2003 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Tille (2003) and updated data provided by Cédric Tille.



























Figure 8. Australia: Components of change in external assets and liabilities, 1989–2003 
Source: authors' calculations based on Australian National Statistics



































Figure 9. Real rate of return on external liabilities and changes in real exchange rate 
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Note: the real domestic currency rate of return on external liabilities is constructed as the sum of the 
yield (interest payments in 1997 divided by the stock of liabilities at end-1996) and the capital gain 
rate (change in stock of external liabilities between 1997 and 1996 minus flow, divided by stock of 
external liabilities at end-1996). The change in the real exchange rate is the percentage change in the 
CPI-based real effective exchange rate between end-1997 and end-1996.  
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, International Financial 
Statistics, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004c). 
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